

23284



Directorate of  
Intelligence

CIA|SW|91-10069

~~Secret~~ Micro

GRAPHIC MATERIAL  
MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

# The Flat Twin ABM Radar: Not as Capable as Previously Believed

*A Technical Intelligence Report*

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

~~Secret~~

SW 91-10069  
October 1991

Cop3

**Warning Notice****Intelligence Sources  
or Methods Involved  
(WNINTEL)****National Security  
Information****Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

<b>Dissemination Control Abbreviations</b>	NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
	NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
	PROPIN (PR)	Caution—proprietary information involved
	ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
	REL...	This information has been authorized for release to...
	WN	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved
A microfiche copy of this document is available from OIR/DLB (703-482-7177); printed copies from CPAS/IMC (703-482-5203 or secure 3-37108; or AIM request to userid CPASIMC). Regular receipt of DI reports can be arranged through CPAS/IMC.		Classified by Declassify: OADR Derived from multiple sources
All material on this page is Unclassified.		



*Directorate of  
Intelligence*

~~Secret~~

# **The Flat Twin ABM Radar: Not as Capable as Previously Believed**

*A Technical Intelligence Report*

This paper was prepared by  
the ~~Office of Scientific~~  
~~and~~ Weapons Research, with contributions from  
OSWR

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to  
OSWR

*Reverse Blank*

~~Secret~~

SW 91-10069  
October 1991

~~Secret~~

**The Flat Twin ABM Radar:  
Not as Capable as  
Previously Believed**

**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 1 August 1991  
was used in this report.*

New analysis of the Soviet Flat Twin ballistic missile defense radar shows that it is not as capable as previously believed.

Our analysis indicates severe constraints imposed on the Flat Twin by its antenna. This strengthens our belief that a widespread, fast-paced Soviet ABM deployment using the Flat Twin is unlikely because of the number of radars required, as well as the extreme difficulty of modifying the Flat Twin to make it perform effectively.

Our analysis of the Flat Twin's antenna indicates that the Flat Twin is much less capable in off-boresight scanning for track and search than we had previously estimated.



Our analysis indicates that the Flat Twin has a maximum scanning capability of about  $\pm 15$  degrees in azimuth and elevation for tracking. It also indicates that the Flat Twin can search less than  $\pm 10$  degrees. This reassessed search capability is considerably less than the earlier estimate of  $\pm 45$  degrees.

Because of the Flat Twin's scanning limitations, a widespread ABM system using the Flat Twin would require an overwhelming number of radars. A system deployed at Moscow and 40 of the most important areas in the Soviet Union would require about 500 to 570 Flat Twin radars. These numbers are about 30 percent higher than our previous assessment. Although the Soviets would require fewer Flat Twin radars to defend their 125 high-priority deployment sites under the START treaty, the number required is still considerable. Under the START treaty limit of about 4,900 US ballistic missile warheads—the level to be achieved by 1996—our modeling indicates that a Soviet defense would require about 510 to 600 Flat Twin radars. Under a potential future START treaty permitting about 2,450 US ballistic missile warheads, we calculate that the number of Flat Twin radars required for defense would be reduced to about 380 to 450.

Given the Flat Twin's limitations as a widespread ABM system, we believe that the Soviets would use a new type of ABM radar. We would expect a new radar to have a greatly improved scan angle, a better multiple-target-tracking capability, and greater detection range. Thus, a significant reduction in the number of radars required in a widespread ABM system would result.

~~Secret~~

## Contents

	Page
Summary	iii
Introduction	1
Role of the Flat Twin in Soviet R&D	1
Flat Twin Radar Characteristics	2
Scan Limitation of the Flat Twin Design	4
Can the Flat Twin Be Modified?	6
Effects of Flat Twin's Limited Performance	7
Defendable Region Limitations	7
Number of Flat Twin Radars Required To Support a Widespread ABM Defense	8
Requirements Under Current US Strategic Force Levels	8
Requirements Under START	9
Implications: A New ABM Radar on the Horizon?	10
 Insets	
 	2
The Deployment Analysis	10
 Appendix	
Flat Twin Core Array	13

~~Secret~~

vi

~~Secret~~

vi

~~Secret~~

## **The Flat Twin ABM Radar: Not as Capable as Previously Believed**

### **Introduction**

The Soviets have used the Flat Twin engagement radar in diverse ways throughout its history. The Flat Twin radar was initially an integral part of an ABM program called the ABM-X-3, which we believe was under development for nationwide deployment before the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972. Despite the demise of that program, the Flat Twin has continued to support weapons systems' developments at both Kamchatka and Saryshagan

Because the Flat Twin is transportable and had been associated with an ABM system intended to be widely deployed, we considered the possibility of the Soviets breaking out of the ABM Treaty with a fast-paced, nationwide ABM system based on the Flat Twin radar and the Gazelle interceptor. We explored the limitations of the Flat Twin radar and the advantages to the Soviets of developing a new ABM radar for a widespread ballistic missile defense

### **Role of the Flat Twin in Soviet R&D**


We believe that the role of the Flat Twin radar in the Soviet ABM program has changed

The Flat Twin radar was designed in the 1960s and was almost certainly intended to be widely deployed as part of the ABM-X-3 system. Before the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviets had begun preparations for ABM testing.

What the Soviets intended to gain from ABM-X-3 testing after signing the ABM Treaty is less clear. However, the demise of the ABM-X-3 system occurred by the late 1970s with the abandonment of the [ ] interceptor program. We believe that Flat Twin testing conducted after 1972 probably stemmed from a requirement to continue to investigate a rapidly deployable system as a hedge against a breakdown of the treaty

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~



[redacted] have both transmit and receive phased-array antenna systems indicating an improved transmitter capability from the prototype (see figure 2). [redacted]

[redacted] the prototype and operational Flat Twins do not differ significantly in performance.

#### Flat Twin Radar Characteristics

Flat Twin is a transportable, multifunction, phased-array radar [redacted]

[redacted] in two versions, [redacted] are similar in size and general appearance. The prototype, [redacted] has a hybrid antenna system that uses a conventional, line-fed, reflector-type transmit antenna and a phased-array receive antenna. The operational Flat Twin radars, [redacted]

Analysis of all-source data indicates that the Flat Twin radar consists of an electronically steered, phased-array antenna mounted on a pedestal that allows mechanical steering in both azimuth and elevation. Once mechanically directed, the Flat Twin

~~Secret~~




~~Secret~~



**Figure 2**  
**Flat Twin Radar**

*The modular design of the Flat Twin makes it transportable.*

**Prototype**



**Operational version**



~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

electronically scans in a limited search area for multiple targets using handover data from long-range surveillance assets.

This electronic scanning feature gives the radar the capability to cover a spatial sector more quickly than could mechanical scanning alone. Theoretically, a Flat Twin-equipped missile battery could engage targets arriving from any direction, although not simultaneously.

Flat Twin consists of a number of modules that can be transported by truck, rail, or aircraft. For example, the Flat Twin's size and mass are such that a single disassembled radar antenna can be carried by an An-124 Condor, a large Soviet aircraft similar to the US C-5A Galaxy. The Flat Twin radar is supported by 20 electronics vans providing power, cooling, and computer support.

We believe that the relocation time, excluding radar checkout, could be reduced to fewer than four months.

#### Scan Limitation of the Flat Twin Design

The Flat Twin is much less capable in off-boresight scanning than our previous estimates indicated.

The Flat Twin has a maximum scanning capability of about  $\pm 15$  degrees from the antenna's boresight in azimuth and elevation for tracking. This indicates that the Flat Twin can search less than  $\pm 10$  degrees.<sup>1</sup> This reassessed search capability is considerably less than the earlier estimate of  $\pm 45$  degrees, which was based on our presumed requirements for an operationally deployed Flat Twin. For example, the

<sup>1</sup> The differences in scan angle result from a requirement to have a higher signal-to-noise ratio for the search process. After a target is acquired, the radar can track targets at a lower signal-to-noise ratio, permitting scans up to  $\pm 15$  degrees.

$\pm 10$ -degree Flat Twin search area represents only 3 percent of the previously assessed  $\pm 45$ -degree search area (see figure 3).

The reduced number of phase shifters in the Flat Twin results in the decrease in its scanning capability from a theoretical maximum of  $\pm 60$  degrees to about  $\pm 15$  degrees. (The scan angle of an antenna decreases as the number of phase shifters is reduced.)

The Flat Twin antenna's face comprises 692 subarrays of about 16 different sizes arranged in a pseudorandom pattern (see figure 4) and a core array, which is probably for beacon tracking of ABM interceptors (see appendix). The total area of the antenna would allow a maximum of 17,000 phase shifters (elements) if spaced one-half wavelength apart. However, the volume of space available behind the face, in addition to one hole per subarray for coaxial wiring, suggests only one phase shifter per subarray.<sup>2</sup> This reduced number of phase shifters—692—is a 96-percent reduction of the theoretical maximum. The reduced number of phase shifters also minimizes the production cost of the radar.


<sup>2</sup> Our analysis indicates that the elements within each subarray are all phased uniformly and that only phases of the individual subarrays—rather than each element—are changed to steer the beam. In the late 1960s, when the Flat Twin was being designed, it was indicated that the Soviets were having difficulties producing phase shifter.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

**Figure 3**  
**Flat Twin Search Area**

*An array with a scan angle of  $\pm 10$  degrees can scan only 3 percent of the area that can be scanned by a radar with a scan angle of  $\pm 45$  degrees. We believe that the Flat Twin has an electronic scan capability of  $\pm 10$  degrees.*




~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

**Figure 4**  
**Flat Twin Bottom Module**

*The Flat Twin antenna's face contains 692 subarrays distributed in three modules. Each hole is assumed to be associated with a subarray.*



We believe that the Flat Twin's scanning capability is limited by the occurrence of secondary antenna pattern maxima (grating lobes) when steered off-boresight. US research on a phased-array antenna with a 96-percent reduction in phase shifters shows that such a radar would have a scan angle of  $\pm 10$  degrees with side lobes more than 30 decibels (dB) below the main beam and a grating lobe more than 25 dB below the main beam (see figure 5).<sup>4</sup> This research agrees with previously published Soviet papers using similar parameters. Grating lobes degrade the antenna pattern and the desired overall system performance. By using random-sized subarrays, several grating lobes appear at different angles, reducing the effect on the antenna

<sup>4</sup> In an antenna radiation pattern, the lesser lobes of progressively decreasing amplitude on either side of the main lobe are the side lobes.

pattern. The maximum grating lobes calculated for the Flat Twin antenna are at least 20 dB down when the antenna is steered 10 degrees off-boresight.

#### **Can the Flat Twin Be Modified?**


We believe that the effort involved in redesigning the Flat Twin to achieve a significant increase in off-boresight scanning capability probably would be tantamount to designing a new phased-array radar. Because of Flat Twin's unique antenna subarray design, any modification in the number of phase shifters to increase the off-boresight scanning capability would be difficult to achieve because of physical

~~Secret~~

Secret

**Figure 5**  
**Tradeoffs of Scan Angle for**  
**Fewer Phase Shifters**

*The Flat Twin design incorporates a 96-percent reduction in phase shifters, which gives it a total scan angle of about 20 to 24 degrees, or an off-boresight scan angle of 10 to 12 degrees.*



constraints on the mechanical support structure. Our analysis indicates that subdividing the subarrays to increase the number of phase shifters would also change the pseudorandom pattern of the subarrays. A new subarray layout would require significant changes in the radar's electronics. It would also require computers more capable than those associated with the Flat Twin

#### Effects of Flat Twin's Limited Performance

##### Defendable Region Limitations

We calculated the regions that can be defended by a Flat Twin/Gazelle ABM system using various scan angles. A defendable region is the area on the ground that can be defended by one ABM unit. Determined from a simple, one-on-one timeline analysis, these defendable regions represent the most optimistic extent of coverage and do not reflect degradations caused by multiple targets, nuclear bursts, or other effects


As the Flat Twin's off-boresight scanning capability is reduced, the defendable region of a Flat Twin/Gazelle system significantly decreases. Our modeling indicates that a Flat Twin with a 10-degree off-boresight search capability could defend only about 600 square kilometers, which is about 8 percent of the area defendable by a  $\pm 45$ -degree radar against a US Minuteman III RV [redacted]. Similar changes in defendable regions also occur against other US RVs when the scan angle is varied [redacted].

We believe this scanning limitation of the Flat Twin indicates that the radar cannot engage widely spaced RVs [redacted].

[redacted] the limited radar scan severely constrains the size of the coverage of the reentry complex. For example, our analysis shows that the  $\pm 15$ -degree tracking limit imposes a maximum crossrange distance between two simultaneously arriving RVs of between 20 and 30 km. A  $\pm 45$ -degree limit, however, would allow the Flat Twin to engage multiple RVs within an 80-km crossrange. The crossrange limitation would require the Soviets to deploy additional Flat Twin radars in a large region such as Moscow or Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) [redacted].

Secret

~~Secret~~



**Number of Flat Twin Radars Required To Support a Widespread ABM Defense Requirements Under Current US Strategic Force Levels.** We have examined the effect that the reduced off-boresight scanning capability of the Flat Twin would have on Soviet deployment of a widespread

ABM defense system. For a selected set of 125 high-priority deployment areas, the defense would require some 780 to 940 Flat Twin radars.

For deployment at Moscow and 40 of the most important areas, about 500 to 570 Flat Twin radars would be required. The number of Flat Twin radars required in this analysis assumes handover data from the LPARs. Without handover data, we calculate that more than twice as many Flat Twin radars would be required to defend these sites.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

The reduced off-boresight scanning capability of the Flat Twin increases Flat Twin deployment estimates by about 30 percent (see figure 9). In a previous analysis,<sup>4</sup> we determined that defense of a selected set of 125 high-priority deployment areas would require some 600 to 720 Flat Twin radars to defend against an attack by US missile forces. The previous analysis also indicated that deployment at Moscow and only

40 of the most important deployment areas would require 380 to 450 Flat Twins. These calculations assumed that the Flat Twin radar would have a 45-degree off-boresight capability.

**Requirements Under START.** The Soviets would require fewer Flat Twin radars to defend their 125 high-priority deployment sites under the START treaty. Under the START treaty limit of about 4,900 US ballistic missile warheads—the level to be

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

## The Deployment Analysis

Recent studies \* have allowed us to estimate the number of components that would be required to deploy a widespread ABM defense system using the Flat Twin and the Gazelle. Likely deployment areas were identified and roughly prioritized. Most of the areas selected contain a high number of military or industrial facilities that would be important to Soviet war-fighting capabilities. Some areas with low target density were selected if they contained one or more targets of critical importance to Soviet offensive or defensive capabilities.

We postulated representative US missile attacks to determine the number and type of RVs that the Soviets might anticipate in a given area. We then estimated in detail the number and optimum arrangement of radars and interceptors that would be required to handle the specific threat to each area.

The numerical ranges in our estimates of required numbers of radars reflect variations in the assumptions made about the attack scenario and component performance. In all cases, we assumed a 95-percent "radar confidence level." Radar confidence is the

probability that one or more RVs will not leak through the defense because a site has too few radars. Sensitivity analyses showed a 95-percent level to be a reasonable compromise between deployment requirements and expected leakage.

Our analysis is intended only to provide a snapshot of an early stage in the Soviet planning process for a territorial defense. In planning an actual deployment, the Soviets would have to anticipate any offensive response, most of which would have the effect of increasing the number of components required. Moreover, the Soviets would be aware that a widespread ABM defense system in violation of the ABM Treaty would be viewed as an open-ended commitment to steadily increase the number of ABM components as long as the United States deployed additional offenses to defeat them.

achieved by 1996—

Indicates that a Soviet defense would require about 510 to 600 Flat Twin radars. Under a potential future START treaty permitting about 2,450 US ballistic missile warheads, we calculate that the number of Flat Twin radars required for defense would be reduced to about 380 to 450 radar.

### **Implications: A New ABM Radar on the Horizon?**

If the Soviets became committed to developing a widespread ABM defense system, we believe that they have two viable options. Most likely, a new radar would be specifically designed to replace the Flat

Twin. However, a radar similar to the Horse Leg radar, the engagement radar prototype for the ABM-4 system's Pill Box battle management radar, could be developed.


We believe that a replacement for the Flat Twin radar would perform significantly better than the Flat Twin because of the evolution of technology since the Flat Twin's inception in the 1960s. The new radar would have a greatly improved scan angle, a better multiple-target-tracking capability, and greater detection range. Such a radar could be designed to be

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

**Figure 9**  
**Flat Twin Deployment Estimates \***



\* Assumes handover from LPARs.

mobile, allowing deployment within a day, rather than transportable like the Flat Twin, which has demonstrated a six-week assembly time. We believe that the Soviets could develop and field a new radar at Kamchatka or Saryshagan within three to five years after they make a decision to build it

A new mobile radar would be more appropriate than the Flat Twin for a widespread ABM defense system. The mobility alone of a new system would increase its survivability [ ] Soviet radar requirements indicates that a new radar could reduce the required number of radars by as much as 60 percent (see figure 10). This reduction in the required number of radars could increase the attractiveness of a nationwide ABM defense system to the Soviets. We believe that the Soviets are not likely to have such a radar


and a new endoatmospheric missile available for deployment—even if such a combination is now in development—until after the year 2000 at the earliest.

The Soviets could also accrue significant technical advantages by deploying a Horse Leg-type radar at Kamchatka. A Horse Leg radar would provide an additional ABM test and training site for the ABM-4 system. It would not, however, provide the Soviets the ability to field a quickly deployed, widespread ABM system. Each Horse Leg and Pill Box radar will take years to construct and would be detected long before they became operational. The Horse Leg and the Pill Box are systems that the Soviets would be more likely

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

**Figure 10**  
**Impact of a New Radar on Soviet ABM Radar Requirements**  
**for a Widespread ABM Defense System**



to choose if, for example, they decided to openly field ABMs in response to US defensive deployments under a modified ABM Treaty, rather than covertly prepare for a fast-paced, nationwide breakout of the ABM Treaty.

If the Soviets choose to improve their ability to be ready to deploy a widespread ABM defense system, they would quite possibly develop a new interceptor as well as a new radar [

] Even if testing

started soon and progressed at a more rapid pace than observed in Soviet ABM programs over the past 15 years, these interceptors would not be ready for deployment until after the year 2000. But we do not know if the interceptors under development are intended for the upgraded Moscow ABM system or are part of a program to investigate a more rapidly deployable option. If they are, in part, intended for an option for a more rapidly deployable ABM system, it is highly likely that the Soviets are also developing radars suitable for rapid deployment.


~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

**Appendix**  
**Flat Twin Core Array**

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Figure 12

Reverse Blank

~~Secret~~